The Logical Plain Method (12.13.2002)
As those philosophers before him, or at least as far back as Descartes, John Locke is “perplexed with obscure terms and useless question” (qtd. in Jones 238), and is interested in starting fresh and free from the opinions of his predecessors. He devises the historical plain method in order to examine the knowledge we posses, with the assumption that the mind is “white paper, void of all characters, without any ideas,” (qtd. in Jones 245). My interest here, however, is to briefly describe, and to evaluate Locke’s historical plain method. The following passages are to demonstrate the chief values and key limitations of the historical plain method as it pertains to its own investigation of what is true from experience, and to show that Locke mistakes a logical approach for a historical approach, meaning that his method is a logical plain method.
The historical plain method allows us to distinguish between what is true, and therefore important enough to warrant our consideration, and what is fantasy and not worth our time. It accomplishes this by examining an object to see whether it has originated from our sense perception, and is thus a sensation, or from the operations of the mind, and thus a reflection. If the object is thus found to have its origins in either the senses or the mind, then it is to be a true object, or one that does exist.
Objects that are conveyed by the senses are such as “hard,” “red,” “loud,” and the like. Some are combinations of more than one simple idea derived from more than one sensory input. In the case of “fast,” the speed of something can both be derived from seeing motion as well as feeling motion. Objects conveyed by the operations of the mind are such as “thinking,” “believing,” “knowing,” etc. These are reflections, “the ideas it affords being such only as the mind gets by reflecting on its own operations within itself,” (qtd. in Jones 246).
Thus, if I have the concept of a unicorn, it should first be examined whether the unicorn concept has its basis in either sensation or reflection before judgments are made about the unicorn. If I have seen a unicorn, then it comes from sensation. If I have reflected to come to an understanding of a unicorn, then it comes from reflection. But since unicorns clearly are derived from neither, then the concept of a unicorn is not true, and therefore it serves no purpose to make judgments about unicorns according to Locke.
By using this approach, it can be seen whether a concept or a term is true or meaningful, or whether it is imaginary or meaningless. This is also demonstrative to us of the origin of the ideas we posses. However, Locke assumes that
…the originals of all our ideas are simple elements. Because of this assumption, Locke’s method became a search for simple units of sensation (or reflection). But do we start with the ideas “red,” “sweet,” “spherical,” and compound them to get he idea “apple?” Or do we see an apple and then, by a process of selective attention, note that it is red, spherical, and so on? Surely, the latter. The world of ordinary experience is a world of objects, and Locke’s simple ideas, far from being starting points of experience, are terminals. (Jones 251)
Locke mistakes a logical order, that we start with ideas and from them derive at objects, for a historical order, that, as noted above, the object comes into experience before simple ideas about the object. Consequently, Locke asked the psychological question of “what are the causes of our ideas?” instead of the epistemological question of “what is the test of truth for our ideas?”
Still, it may be valuable to examine our ideas on psychological terms and to break them down into their respective simple ideas. This allows us to simplify and categorize, as humans are prone to do, in order to understand the whole on the basis of its parts. Though the psychological examination of our ideas may yield more certainty, in that it is a logical derivation, its limitation is such that it is less instructive because it is less reflective of the natural world of objects. Whereas the epistemological inquiry of the testability of our ideas as to whether they are true or not instructs us more as to the reality of objects, but it may not have the ability to be proven beyond any doubt, and is thus less certain than the logical inquiry.
Locke’s historical plain method, named so incorrectly, endeavors to show what is true and false, what is meaningful and meaningless, and therefore, what is important and what is not important. By examining objects it deems to demonstrate their origin as being of sensation or reflection. Since Locke assumed all ideas to be based on simple elements however, he pursued in that direction, which is a psychological and logical one. Thus, Locke developed the logical plain method, but mistakenly named it the historical plain method. For the historical order begins with the objects, and through investigation of it, we derive its simple elements.
Works cited
Jones, W. T. Hobbes to Hume. 2nd edition. Fort Worth: Harcourt, 1980.
