The Four Fallacies (12.05.2002)
In order to embark on his quest for truth, Descartes first devises his four rules which should serve as a solid foundation for all else that he comes to understand. Those rules are here evaluated in terms of what they fail to take into consideration. The rules are examined individually and consecutively, and are therefore also reiterated in order to be clear about them. Furthermore, the approach of using these rules is also analyzed to some degree. Ultimately, however, it is my conjecture that Descartes’ four rules are not as solid a foundation as he claims, but fail to consider key issues which are noted herein.
Descartes’ first rule deals with the notion of truth, and states it as follows.
The first [rule] was never to accept anything as true that I did not plainly know to be such; that is to say, carefully to avoid hasty judgment and prejudice; and to include nothing more in my judgments than what presented itself to my mind so clearly and so distinctly that I had no occasion to call it in doubt. (11)
In essence, we are to accept only what is true. This brings up the question of how one can even know truth. For Descartes, the certain truth is “I think, therefore I am,” which is his first principle. However, even if this is a certain truth, how can we know anything else to be true? More importantly, however, the first rule states that nothing should be accepted that can be called into doubt, or to accept only that which is indubitable. Yet how can anything be indubitable, save perhaps Descartes’ first principle, and even there some may be able to find flaws? It seems doubtful whether anything can be proven beyond any reasonable doubt.
Nevertheless, Descartes may practice a method of radically doubting the subjective information of our senses and experience, but it appears that what he holds as being objective is that which is quantifiable. For him, “the method that teaches one to follow the true order and to enumerate exactly all the circumstances of what one is seeking contains everything that gives certainty to the rules of arithmetic (12).”
Still, the notion of one’s existence as proven by thought is not something which can be measured and translated into a numerical quantity. In fact, most fundamental concepts and their corresponding emotions that make up human life, such as love, are neither indubitable nor quantifiable, though are still held as being true, sometimes more than anything else.
This leads me to find that the very first of Descartes’ rules is a shaky foundation at best. It asks for an acceptance of indubitable truth, and only that truth. But if this is to be indeed held as a standard, then nothing could actually be accepted with certainty.
The second [rule], to divide each of the difficulties I would examine into as many parts as possible and as was required in order better to resolve them. (11)
The basis of this second rule appears to be an endeavor to take a claim and examine it from all possible perspectives, and to test it against all possible situations. Neither of which is, in effect, possible. One could spend an entire lifetime looking at all the possible situations in which a claim could be contested and would not even come close to revealing all of those situations. The human brain cannot conceive of all the possible scenarios what could exist either.
Thus, the second rule seems to serve no purpose if all difficulties cannot be examined, and they cannot be resolved so easily if nothing can be accepted with certainty.
The third [rule], to conduct my thoughts in an orderly fashion, by commencing with those objects that are simplest and easiest to know, in order to ascend little by little, as by degrees, to the knowledge of the most composite things, and by supposing an order even among those things that do not naturally precede one another. (11)
This third rule tells us to begin with what is easiest to know, and from there to “ascend little by little.” Before we can begin with what is easiest to know, however, we must determine what that is. As in Descartes’ first rule, the fact of whether anything can be known is questionable. Though for him, the “I think, therefore I am” is a foundation for his theory of substance. When reflecting upon his first principle, Descartes notes how it leads to another thing that is easiest to know.
From this I knew that I was a substance the whole essence or nature of which is simply to think, and which, in order to exist, has no need of any place nor depends on any material thing. Thus this “I,” that is to say, the soul through which I am what I am, is entirely distinct from the body and is even easier to know than the body, and even if there were no body at all, it would not cease to be all that it is. (19)
This means that the mind, or the metaphysical, is easier to know than the body, or the physical. Thus the “I,” or soul, is the substance that can be known easiest, and that which is to be a beginning for any consecutive reasoning there from, as prescribed by the third rule.
However, this is assuming that we discount sense perception, as, for Descartes, our senses and our experiences are unreliable. Yet this notion itself is far from indubitable. Verily, it is our senses that we know first before we learn to reflect inwardly, and it is our senses that tell us how the world works. Without the senses there would be no experience, and without experience it is not really possible to understand anything. So, in essence, it would be more appropriate to say that what is easier to know is the senses. But that is no more certain than Descartes’ contention that the soul is easier to know. Therefore, the only thing that is certain, is that the only thing that is easiest to know, is that neither the physical nor the metaphysical can be known with more ease.
Consequently, the third rule fails to account for some of the same issues as the first rule, which are whether anything can truly be known, with certainty, and beyond any reasonable doubt. And, since neither the physical, nor the metaphysical, can be known with that degree of certainty, the third rule appears not to be going anywhere on account of this dilemma.
The fourth rule bears many similarities to the second rule, and, therefore, its liabilities as well.
And the last [rule], everywhere to make enumerations so complete and reviews so general that I am assured of having omitted nothing.
As the second rule, this one too presupposes to examine all possible situations as to omit nothing. This, as before, is not possible, to account for all possible scenarios and all possible variables.
Therefore, the fourth rule, as the second rule, contains an immovable obstacle that keeps it from serving its function as a device for the conduct of Descartes’ reasoning.
In the end, the four rules as laid out by Descartes as a foundation for all of his reasoning to follow do not serve their purpose as desired. The first rule calls for the acceptance of only what is true beyond any doubt. This rules out all knowledge, as nothing is indubitable. The second and fourth rules call for an examination of all variables and scenarios against a situation or concept, which is beyond the limits of human capacity. And the third rule asks to begin with what is easiest to know and ascend there from, which has similar logistic problems as the first rule. Since nothing can be known beyond all doubt, then there is no thing that is easier to know than another.
Descartes’ use of this approach is a false foundation as he does not see these complications. The underlying frailty of such rules is that it assumes absolute truths, without exceptions. I do not know of any truths that are absolute, and do not know of anyone who does. But more importantly, this approach would be much more effective if it was an inductive, and not a deductive, method. With an inductive method Descartes could not be refuted with a single instance, and he would not need to account for all contesting situations. It seems doubtful whether an absolutely deductive method could ever exist, based on the limits of human knowledge.
Works Cited
René Descartes. Discourse on Method and Meditations on First Philosophy. 4th edition. Trans. Donald A. Cress. Indianapolis: Hackett, 1998.
