Certain Uncertainty (12.16.2002)
Hume wrote, “be a philosopher; but, amidst all your philosophy, be still a man,” (qtd. in Jones 351). This statement strikes me more than all others, written by Hume or any of the philosophers from W. T. Jones’ Hobbes to Hume. It demonstrates to me that even after all of the inquisition towards what and how we can know anything, and the very methodical ways in which Hume is reputed to examine these things, he realizes that nothing is truly certain and begins to lean towards a pragmatic and radically empirical point of view. It is, therefore, also my conclusion that, as much as we may aspire to find the universal, indubitable, and objective truth, none of it can be proven to be universal, indubitable, and objective.
In support of this view—the “abandonment of the quest for certainty, acceptance of provisional solutions as long as they work, and readiness to discard them when changing conditions make them no longer appropriate”—I will endeavor to briefly examine substance, the self, and the presumed necessary connection of ideas or events (Jones 349).
By applying his own empirical criterion of meaning to the examination of such a notably philosophical concept as substance, Hume flat out disposes of the entire notion itself. As has been formerly introduced by Descartes, substance is a fluctuating thing that takes on the same meaning as is best described by that certain je ne sais quoi. It is that certain something you just can’t put your finger on, and “by substance, we can understand nothing else than a thing which so exists that it needs no other thing in order to exist,“ (qtd. in Jones 174-175). Descartes naturally takes this thing to be God, but never questions the meaning of God or substance as to what these “things” really are.
Similarly, Locke finds substance to be “nothing but the supposed, but unknown, support of those qualities we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist . . . without something to support them,” (qtd. in Jones 249). This is an instance where substance is, once again, diminished to a “thing” which no one really knows the essence of, and yet, it is so generally accepted as existing.
For Hume, however, the notion of substance and the question of its essence and existence was a very simple matter of applying his empirical criterion of meaning.
I wou’d fain ask those philosophers, who found so much of their reasonings on the distinction of substance and accident, and imagine we have clear ideas of each, whether the idea of substance be deriv’d from the impression of sensation or reflexion? If it be perceiv’d by the eyes, it must be a colour; if by the ears, a sound; if by the palate, a taste; and so of the other senses. But I believe none will assert, that substance is either as colour, or a sound, or a taste. The idea of substance must therefore be deriv’d from an impression of reflexion, if it really exist. But the impressions of reflexion resolve themselves into our passions and emotions; one of which can possibly represent a substance. We have therefore no idea of substance, distinct from that of a collection of particular qualities, nor have we any other meaning when we either talk or reason concerning it. (qtd. in Jones 304)
So, very directly, since substance has its origins in neither our senses nor in the operations of our minds, it does not exist to Hume. And, frankly, since the notion has been introduced in my own philosophical inquiries, I have never been able to understand completely what the various philosophers mean by the term “substance.” The question of “but what is substance” is never satisfied by the accounts of those philosophers who claim to have the answer. It can be thus concluded, at least provisionally, that since no one is able to provide good evidence for the essence and existence or substance, it either does not exist, or that we have no method of having knowledge or an understanding of substance.
Furthermore, Hume continues this type of an application of his empirical criterion of meaning in respect to the self as well. He asserts that, once again, we have no distinct impression of the self, since
It must be some one impression, that gives rise to every real idea. But self or person is not any one impression, but that to which our several impressions and ideas are suposs’d to have a reference. If any impression gives rise to the idea of self, that impression must continue invariable the same, thro’ the whole course of our lives; since self is suppos’d to exist after that manner. But there is no impression constant and invariable. Pain and pleasure, grief and joy, passions and sensations succeed each other, and never all exist at the same time. It cannot, therefore, be from any of these impressions, or from any other, that the idea of self is deriv’d; and consequently there is no such idea. . . . (qtd. in Jones 305)
However, I must once again point out that it is still unclear as to what we mean by the term “self.” If it is to mean the conscious, the “I” which is thinking at this very moment, and it seems that that is what Hume is referring to, then it may very well be true that we have no real impression of our self. Nevertheless, simply because we possess no knowledge of something, that is not to say that it does not exist; and it may very well be that we simply have no such words or perception appropriate enough to be able to discern the notion. For it is true that learned persons have come to more accurate understandings of the world in the sciences, and though that process seems to be ever so much slower in philosophy, it is conceivable that the same will continue to occur as it has done until now.
Hence it can be put, that since we have no clear and distinct single impression of the self, then it follows to say that we have no clear and distinct idea of the self. And though we may not have an idea of self, that does not mean that there is no self, but simply that we may not now posses the faculties to understand the concept, and that our supposition is, once again, a provisional one.
In addition, Hume saw that the scientific method of the times was based on an assumption of a necessary connection between ideas or events, and was interested is examining this notion since the scientific method did seem successful. The commonly accepted understanding of a necessary connection stood little chance to Hume’s penetrating logic, and it too was quickly reduced to a mere feigning of the human imagination. As Jones puts it, “if every impression is a distinct item in our experience (‘entirely loose and separate’), there can be no necessary connection between two ideas derived from two impressions, however closely juxtaposed (‘conjoined’) the original impressions may have been,” (318). This summary of Hume’s refutation of a necessary connection does account for the fact that this is only true if the premises are correct, and, that they are, if Hume’s empirical criterion of meaning is accepted.
In actuality, the idea of a necessary connection is a feigned one which our imagination conceives from “(1) a repeated sequence of impressions and (2) the expectation that on its next occurrence, the first impression of the sequence will again be followed by the second,” (Jones 319). Since this seems to conflict with the very core of physics, especially when applied to the universe and all atoms contained therein, which generally states that all motion is the effect of a collision, and all things operate on the basis that particles are in motion or at rest, it is a deduction that is not entirely certain and indubitable. So there is a definite dissonance between the world of science, as is based on physics, and the world of reason, as is presented to us by Hume; especially when he later concludes that science is merely “limited to empirical generalization,” (Jones 320). Yet both cases seem strongly plausible, though neither can be proven beyond all doubt.
Thus it is necessary to return to the notion that which ever system one adopts, both must be treated as “provisional solutions as long as they work,” (Jones 349). Hume first negates our belief in such an abstraction as substance, then shows us that we have no reason to believe in our self, and finally removes reasons for the existence of any connection between any of the ideas which we as a species have always held as being related. Hume also refutes any reason to believe in the existence of an external world, or a world without us, which has not been discussed here. In the end, there is really no reason to believe in the existence of existence, if Hume’s deductions are to be taken quite so seriously. Of course, if that were to be done, none could live as they do.
Since Hume himself is concerned with a philosophy that concerns the everyday individual, not even he can truly accept that nothing exists. It is when he reaches this point himself that he realizes one can “be a philosopher; but, amidst all your philosophy, be still a man,” (qtd. in Jones 351).
Works cited
Jones, W. T. Hobbes to Hume. 2nd edition. Fort Worth: Harcourt, 1980.
